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In South Africa, the term “planning” has different meanings. To paraphrase the words of Jafta 
J in the landmark Constitutional Court decision in Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others:1  
 
Different planning responsibilities are conferred on each of the three spheres of government in 
accordance with what is appropriate to each sphere. To reduce the term to its bare minimum, planning 
comprises the control and regulation of the use of land. 
 
As a starting point, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (hereafter the 
“Constitution”), sets out and defines the powers of the national, provincial and local 
government. This results in recognition being given to the importance of each sphere’s 
independence and its exclusive competence over the powers which it has been allocated.2 
Municipal planning in particular, is a power allocated to municipalities.3 The Constitution does 
not, define municipal planning nor set out exactly what this concept includes. 
 
Municipal planning was defined by Jafta J in the same Gauteng Development Tribunal case 
referred to above:4 
 
Returning to the meaning of “municipal planning”, the term is not defined in the Constitution. But 
“planning” in the context of municipal affairs is a term which has assumed a particular, well-established 
meaning which includes the zoning of land and the establishment of townships. In that context, the term 
is commonly used to define the control and regulation of the use of land. There is nothing in the 
Constitution indicating that the word carries a meaning other than its common meaning which includes 
the control and regulation of the use of land. It must be assumed, in my view, that when the Constitution 
drafters chose to use “planning” in the municipal context, they were aware of its common meaning. 
Therefore, I agree with the Supreme Court of Appeal that in relation to municipal matters the 
Constitution employs “planning” in its commonly understood sense. 
 
                                                        
1 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others 2010 (6) SA 
182 (CC), ad para 53. 
2 Section 40 of the Constitution. 
3 Ibid, section 156(1)(a), read with Part B of Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 




Prior to the Constitution, planning decisions were governed by provincial legal instruments, 
such as the various planning ordinances for the so-called “white areas”.5 These planning 
ordinances bestowed upon municipalities the powers to grant or refuse approvals when 
applications were made for changes in land use, rezonings, special consent, and removal of 
restrictive conditions, amongst others, (I will hereafter refer to these applications as “planning 
applications”). 
 
When such approvals and refusals on planning applications were contentious, the various 
ordinances provided objectors and/or applicants the right to appeal the decisions taken by 
municipalities. These appeals were heard by provincial appeal bodies established by the 
ordinances. These appeal bodies had the power to approve, discard or replace the 
municipalities’ decisions on the planning applications, with their own.  
 
The ordinances did not provide for, or intend to assist, black persons who, under apartheid, 
were forced to live in homelands which were regulated by separate planning legislation.6 
The court in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case succinctly summarised the above 
problem:7  
 
As has been alluded to above, the difficulty with these ordinances is that they apply only in those 
territories that formed part of the old Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal provinces. They have 
no application to the former “independent” homelands and self-governing territories, which were 
governed by a parallel system of planning legislation. Furthermore, the creation of the nine provinces 
has meant that there has been further fragmentation as each province may be subject to a multiplicity of 
territorially-based legislative regimes. 
 
The Development Facilitation Act (hereafter “DFA”),8 was enacted with the intention to, 
“facilitate and speed up the implementation of reconstruction and development programmes 
and projects in relation to land” and laying down a uniform system for land development to 
address the fragmented planning framework left by the legacy of apartheid, which had been 
allowed to continue by the ordinances.9  
                                                        
5 Town Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986, Land Use and Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985, Orange 
Free State’s Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 and Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949. 
6 Examples of these acts are the Black Administration Act 18 of 1927 and the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913. 
7 Ad para 32. 
8 The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 





Planning applications made under the DFA were decided by development tribunals, formed in 
each province.10 Thereafter, any appeal against the decision of a development tribunal would 
be decided by a development appeal tribunal,11 which was also formed for each province.12 
 
Developers therefore had the choice of whether to make planning applications in terms of either 
the DFA, or the old order ordinances. This understandably brought even more confusion and 
chaos to an already complicated and fragmented municipal planning application framework. In 
this regard, the Western Cape High Court in the case of Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents 
Association and Others v The Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration (Western 
Cape) and Others summed up the existing planning regime as follows:13 
 
The present application illustrates that the statutory framework regulating town planning and building 
regulations in its present form is fragmented and cumbersome in the extreme…It requires a vast 
bureaucratic machine to administer all these provisions. This inevitably leads to certain 'practices' which 
develop in the course of time in the administration of these pieces of legislation, which may or may not 
necessarily correspond with the legislative regime which underpins the process. The system 
also frequently - as in the present case - gives rise to conflicting and inconsistent decisions taken by 
different functionaries, officials and organs at different levels of local and provincial government. It 
would be of great assistance to everyone involved in the process, from ordinary ratepayers to developers 
to officials, if the administrative machinery required to regulate these matters could be consolidated, 
simplified and streamlined by the Legislature... 
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the enactment of the Constitution and its resultant allocation of 
government functions, and municipalities’ exclusive jurisdiction to administer municipal 
planning, the de facto position was that the provinces continued to perform the function of 
municipal planning. The provinces unlawfully exercised the competence of municipal planning 
through the appeal bodies created by the ordinances, which could replace municipalities’ 
decisions on planning applications, and through development tribunals and development 
appeal tribunals formed in terms of the DFA.   
 
                                                        
10 Ibid, section 15(1). 
11 Ibid, section 23(1). 
12 Ibid, section 24(1). 
13 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Others v The Minister of Planning, Culture and 




It was only in the face of several landmark court challenges, that it became apparent that the 
existing planning legal framework, through both the DFA and the ordinances, was 
unconstitutional and needed replacing. The comments of Judge Griesel referred to above,14 
were finally acted upon, through governmental acknowledgement that new, national legislation 
was required to rectify this overlap of powers. The resultant legislation is the Spatial Planning 
and Land Use Management Act (hereafter referred to as “SPLUMA”).15 
 
SPLUMA provides that appeals against decisions made by municipal planning tribunals on 
planning applications are heard by appeal authorities which are also municipal entities.16 
SPLUMA therefore protects municipalities’ constitutionally granted competence of municipal 
planning, from interference by provincial or national government. 
 
While SPLUMA has greatly improved the legal framework relating to planning applications 
and appeals thereto, it has not completely cured the defects of the previous planning acts and 
ordinances, and it is possibly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Municipalities have faced 
considerable challenges implementing SPLUMA.17 As such, the processes SPLUMA has 
sought to prescribe are not always able to be implemented by municipalities, nor always 
effective in reality. 
 
This dissertation seeks to assess the stated objectives of SPLUMA, with a particular emphasis 
on how it has sought to regulate planning applications and appeals thereto. This assessment 
will also address the implementation challenges that municipalities face almost three years after 
the commencement of SPLUMA. 
  
This dissertation will be structured to answer the above, starting in Chapter 2 with a background 
to the historical development of the laws relating to planning applications and appeals thereto. 
This background addresses the various provincial ordinances and the DFA, and the various 
court challenges thereto, which led to the enactment and commencement of SPLUMA. 
                                                        
14 Camps Bay Ratepayers case, see supra footnote 13. 
15 The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013. 
16 There are circumstances where a non-municipal body can be appointed to perform the functions of an appeal 
authority, as will be discussed hereunder in Chapter 3. 
17 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, ‘Progress Report on the Implementation of the Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) – Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Rural 
Development and Land Reform’, pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/150812SPLUMA.ppt, 





Thereafter, in Chapter 3, this dissertation will look at the changes brought by SPLUMA, 
specifically in the way that planning applications, (defined in the DFA18 and later in 
SPLUMA19 as “land development” applications), and appeals thereto, are now legislated for.   
 
Chapter 4 sets out the challenges that municipalities face in implementing SPLUMA, and 
where SPLUMA is legally deficient. 
 
Thereafter, in Chapter 5, various solutions and suggestions intended to remedy and improve 
SPLUMA are provided. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 will summarise the previous chapters and conclude this dissertation. 
  
2. The background to SPLUMA:  
 
2.1 The genesis of SPLUMA: 
 
As mentioned above, SPLUMA was enacted in response to chapters V and VI of the 
DFA being found to be unconstitutional, as it allowed provinces to usurp the 
municipalities’ exclusive competency to administer municipal planning. 
 
But in truth, the genesis of SPLUMA can be found much earlier, and is evidenced in 
two documents, the first of which was the Draft Green Paper on Development and 
Planning which was drafted in 1999.20  
 
This paper identified the conflict that existed between the three spheres of 
government.21 It therefore recommended the approach of, “…rationalising the legal 
                                                        
18 Section 1 of the DFA. 
19 Section 1 of SPLUMA. 
20 National Development and Planning Commission, Draft Green Paper on Development and Planning National 
Development and Planning Commission, 22 April 1999, 
https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/devplan_1.pdf, accessed on 18 November 2017. 
21 Ibid, where it states that “While the advent of the DFA and new legislation in several provinces is informed 
by a new approach to planning, many problems remain. These include a lack of shared vision about what spatial 
development should be; a lack of co-ordination between different spheres of government and between different 
departments; a lack of capacity; a high degree of legal and procedural complexity; and a very slow pace of land 




framework by assisting provinces to repeal all existing provincial planning legislation 
and to enacting a single piece of planning legislation within a national framework…”22  
and further, “…clarifying the roles of the different spheres of government and the 
framework for decision making. These goals would be achieved by the National 
Development and Planning Commission assisting provinces to draft new legislation.”23 
 
It also highlighted the practical problems of implementing the DFA:24 
 
The DFA tribunal system is only required in the provinces that have adopted the DFA. No 
tribunals have been set up in the Western Cape which did not adopt any aspects of the DFA. 
Even in provinces where they exist, developers can choose whether or not to use them over and 
above any other route for approval of a development application. This means their significance 
has not been as great as it could have been, given the wide powers they potentially have to fast 
track development by overriding certain laws; 
  
and the problems with having multiple planning instruments generally:25 
 
…land development approval procedures are excessively slow and cumbersome, to the extent 
that the economics of land development is being compromised and the private-sector 
development community is losing faith and patience with the system. In particular, there is no 
single, simple route for land-related applications. 
 
However, it supported the status quo of provinces exercising appeal powers over 
decisions made by municipalities:26 
 
It is recommended that each province should appoint a development appeal board which should 
serve as the single point in the province for the hearing of all land development and land use-
related appeals. The appeal board should consist of professionals from appropriate disciplines, 
appointed by the MEC after a broad consultation process. 
 
                                                        
22 Ibid, at page 5.  
23 Ibid, at page 6. 
24 Ibid, at page 11. 
25 Ibid, at page 19. 




The second document was the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Development, drafted in 2001,27 which also envisaged a uniform and consistent 
approach to land use planning nationwide.28 However, while it did recognise that each 
sphere of government should be entitled to administer its own competency,29 it still 
proposed that the provincial and national government spheres would have the power to 
review the exercise of municipal powers relating to municipal planning.30 
 
It was therefore clear that while these papers envisaged a uniform system of municipal 
and spatial planning, they failed to acknowledge that municipalities ought to be 
completely autonomous in relation to municipal planning and reaffirm the position of 
provincial appeal tribunals reviewing the decision of municipalities, as it states, “The 
premier of each province shall appoint the appeal tribunal. The appeal tribunal shall 
hear appeals from land development decisions taken by municipalities and land use 
tribunals”. 
 
2.2 The planning legislation applicable to different racial groups: 
 
As mentioned earlier, the various ordinances were only applicable to the old Cape, 
Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal provinces.31  
 
During apartheid, numerous acts were passed to separate non-white people from white 
people. While this dissertation does not seek to address the full history of apartheid 
legislation, some of the acts relevant to the municipal planning context are discussed. 
 
                                                        
27 Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Development, 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, https://www.gov.za/documents/spatial-planning-and-land-use-
management-white-paper, accessed on 17 November 2017. 
28 See the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Development (2001) which states that “The White 
Paper proposes one set of such procedures for the whole country, thereby eliminating the current situation where 
different procedures apply in different provinces, and even within a province in different apartheid race zones”. 
29 Ibid, where it states that “Each national department, provincial government, and municipality must take 
responsibility for spatial planning within their sectoral and or jurisdictional areas”. 
30 Ibid, where it states that “The most prevalent land use regulators will be municipalities. Each province will 
have a provincial land use tribunal and appeal tribunal that will be land use regulators in specified situations. 
Nationally the Minister will be a land use regulator of last resort, only acting in cases where there has been 
neglect or flouting of the national principles and norms.” 




Firstly, the government implemented the policy of separation of racial groups through 
several acts including the Natives Land Act,32 the Natives (Urban Areas) Act,33 the 
Native Administrative Act,34 the Natives Laws Amendment Act,35 the Group Areas 
Act,36 the Natives Resettlement Act.37 Through these acts, separate “native areas” were 
demarcated (and later “homelands”), which were designated for black people and black 
people were prohibited from purchasing or leasing land outside the areas designated for 
them. 
 
The Black Communities Development Act38 was also enacted to facilitate racially 
separate areas and in terms of this act land was designated for black people but also 
managed as separate zones. Therefore, an area could be zoned as a place of residence 
for black people, but maintained as an area in which black people could not own land. 
Regulations were promulgated in terms of this act namely, the Regulations relating to 
Township Establishment and Land Use,39which regulated township establishment and 
set out land use conditions applicable to black areas.  
 
There were also regulations promulgated in terms of the Natives Administration Act, 
namely Township Development Regulations40 and the Land Use Planning 
Regulations,41 which regulations dealt with township establishment and the preparation 
of town planning schemes respectively. 
 
In this way, by the time apartheid was ending, there were different planning laws 
applicable to white urban areas, and black areas. These laws were largely repealed by 
the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991.42 
 
                                                        
32 The Natives Act 27 of 1913. 
33 The Natives (Urban Areas Act) 21 of 1923. 
34 Native Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
35 Natives Laws Amendment Act 46 37. 
36 The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. 
37 The Natives Resettlement Act 19 of 1954. 
38 Black Communities Development Act 4 1984. 
39 GNR 1897, 1986.  
40 GNR R1886, 1990. 
41 GNR 1888, 1990. 





2.3 The enactment of the Constitution and the allocation of powers to the various spheres 
 of government: 
 
The Constitution is the most important source of law in South Africa, and it sets out 
obligations,43 which obligations are allocated to, and are required to be fulfilled by 
various spheres of government (national, provincial and local).44 
 
Each sphere is required to “exercise their powers and perform their functions in a 
manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity 
of government in another sphere”45 and national and provincial spheres cannot prevent 
municipalities from performing their final functions.46 
 
Local government has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer 
the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of 
the Constitution.47 Part B of Schedule 4 includes, “Municipal planning”. 
 
There is no definition of “Municipal Planning” in the Constitution, and as referred to 
above, the Constitutional Court was required to provide a definition, which definition 
states that it should be interpreted in its commonly understood sense.48 
 
As a result of the enactment of the Constitution, it very quickly became evident that the 
existing planning ordinances were flawed insofar as they allowed provinces to decide 
planning applications, and effectively administer municipal planning instead of 
municipalities. Furthermore, the DFA, which was enacted just prior to the enactment 
of the final Constitution, also flouted the constitutional allocation of municipal planning 
powers to municipalities. 
 
The result of these unconstitutional planning laws was a series of landmark cases which 
are discussed further hereunder. 
                                                        
43 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
44 Ibid, section 40(1). 
45 Ibid, section 41(1)(g). 
46 Ibid, section 151. 
47 Ibid, section 156. 





2.4 The constitutionality of the DFA: 
 
The DFA, which was enacted prior to the enactment of the Constitution49 was, at the 
time, considered to be a turning point in South Africa’s planning legislation history, 
and brought a new approach to municipal planning and town planning applications. 50 
 
The DFA effectively provided a new name for planning applications, that of “land 
development” applications:51 
 
“land development” means any procedure aimed at changing the use of land for the purpose of 
using the land mainly for residential, industrial, business, small-scale farming, community or 
similar purposes, including such a procedure in terms of Chapter V, VI or VII, but excluding 
such a procedure in terms of any other law relating exclusively to prospecting or mining. 
 
As mentioned previously, these land development applications were to be decided by 
development tribunals and were appealable to development appeal tribunals, both 
provincial bodies. 
 
Clearly, the primary purpose of the DFA and the formation of these tribunals was to 
speed up the process of land development applications, evident by its preamble in which 
it states, “To introduce extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the 
implementation of reconstruction and development programmes and projects in relation 
to land; and in so doing to lay down general principles governing land development 
throughout the Republic…”, and thereafter it follows, “…to provide for nationally 
uniform procedures for the subdivision and development of land in urban and rural 
areas so as to promote the speedy provision and development of land for residential, 
small-scale farming or other needs and uses…”. 
 
Despite its progressive approach and noble intentions, it was clear that the DFA was 
permitting provinces to usurp the function of municipal planning from municipalities. 
In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, the Constitutional Court ruled that chapters 
                                                        
49 The DFA commenced on the 22 December 1995. The Constitution commenced on the 4 February 1997. 
50 Van Wyk J Planning Law (1999) 585. 




V and VI of the DFA were unconstitutional for this very reason. In this case, Justice 
Jafta recognised and explained the municipalities’ exclusive rights to administer 
municipal planning, and found that the DFA violated this:52 
 
It was further submitted that Chapters V and VI of the Act were not concerned with planning 
but that they have permissibly established institutions with adjudicatory powers to determine 
land development applications. I have pointed out already that in granting applications for 
rezoning or the establishment of townships the development tribunals encroach on the 
functional area of “municipal planning”. The form that such encroachment takes matters not. It 
follows, therefore, that the impugned chapters are inconsistent with section 156 of the 
Constitution read with Part B of Schedule 4. 
 
This decision by the Constitutional Court was therefore the catalyst required to give 
effect to the visions of the Draft Green Paper on Development and Planning and the 
White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Development, and it ultimately led to 
the enactment of SPLUMA.53  
 
While SPLUMA was eventually enacted in 2013, repealing the DFA in its entirety, it 
only came into effect on 1 July 2015.54 
 
2.5 The constitutionality of the previous planning ordinances and acts: 
 
As mentioned, prior to the enactment of SPLUMA, planning applications were 
governed by various provincial ordinances and acts. After the enactment of the 
Constitution and the allocation of the competence of municipal planning to 
municipalities, there were several legal challenges to these ordinances and acts, which 





                                                        
52 Gauteng Development Tribunal case, ad paras 69 and 70, see supra footnote 1. 
53 Ibid, despite declaring the DFA unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court did however suspend the 
declaration for a period of two years for Parliament to “to correct the defects or enact new legislation”, ad para 7 
of the order. 




2.5.1 Land Use and Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985: 
 
The Cape Land Use and Planning Ordinance, (hereafter referred to as 
“LUPO”)55 was a planning ordinance which was applied to the Western Cape, 
Eastern Cape, Northern Cape provinces and parts of the North West province.56  
In terms of LUPO, planning applications were heard and decided on by the 
council of a municipality57 and appeals against decisions made by a council 
were heard by the Administrator, who was the competent authority to whom 
administration of LUPO was assigned, in those provinces.58 
 
The first legal challenge to LUPO came in the case of the Minister of Local 
Government, Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and 
Others,59 where a developer’s planning application, (a rezoning application), 
had been initially approved by the municipality and thereafter refused by the 
provincial Minister in terms of LUPO.60 The developer brought an application 
in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, (hereafter “PAJA”),61 
to review the province’s decision, on the basis that the Minister did not have the 
functional competence to decide on the matter, as it fell under the municipal 
competence of “municipal planning”. The matter was heard by both the Western 
Cape High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal before finally being 
appealed to, and heard by, the Constitutional Court. 
 
The Constitutional Court was not asked, nor required, to make a ruling on 
whether or not LUPO was unconstitutional and simply made an order to the 
effect that LUPO was still in effect and therefore empowered the provincial 
Minister to make decisions in terms of clause 16 of LUPO. As an obiter 
statement however, the judgment did state that there was at least a “strong case”, 
that such provincial intrusion was unconstitutional.62 
                                                        
55 The Cape Land Use and Planning Ordinance no. 15 of 1985. 
56 Ibid, clause 1, definition of “province”. 
57 As per clauses 9(1), 15(1)(b), 16(1) and 23(1) of LUPO. 
58 Ibid clauses 1 and 44(1)(a). 
59 Minister of Local Government, Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others 2014 (1) SA 
521 (CC).  
60 LUPO, clause 16. 
61 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 





The constitutionality of LUPO was finally decided upon in the case of Minister 
of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, 
Western Cape v Habitat Council and Others.63 In this case, two planning 
applications were made to the municipality in terms of LUPO, which 
applications were refused. In both matters, appeals were made to the Minister 
of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the 
Western Cape, which appeals were upheld.  
 
The City of Cape Town and Habitat Council approached the High Court for a 
declaratory order that clause 44 of LUPO, which related to the province’s appeal 
powers, was unconstitutional. The requested order was granted.64 The 
Constitutional Court was thereafter approached to confirm the declaratory 
order. 
 
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the appeal powers in LUPO were 
unconstitutional as it, “...allows the Province to interfere in all municipal land-
use decisions and substitute its decisions for those of the municipality…”.65  
 
This judgment followed the reasoning of the Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case,66 and this case was the first instance of a planning ordinance being 
declared unconstitutional. 
 
As a direct response to the Habitat Council case, (and its resultant obligations 
in terms of SPLUMA), the Western Cape Province has subsequently enacted 
the Western Cape Land Use Management Act to replace LUPO.67 
 
                                                        
63 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v Habitat 
Council and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC). 
64 Habitat Council and Another v Provincial Minister of Local Government, Western Cape, and Others [2013] 
ZAWCHC 112; 2013 (6) SA 113 (WCC). 
65 Habitat Council case, ad paras 11 to 15. 
66 Ibid, para 13.  
67 Western Cape Land Use Management Act 3 of 2014 commenced in various municipalities at different dates, 





The other case with relevance to LUPO and the constitutional allocation of 
powers, is the case of Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others.68 
While this case did not involve the interplay between municipalities and 
provinces relating to appeals against planning application decisions made in 
terms of LUPO, the court made many important findings related to ‘municipal 
planning’ in favour of municipalities. The court held:69 
 
The Constitution allocates powers to three spheres of government in accordance with 
the functional vision of what is appropriate to each sphere. But because these 
powers are not contained in hermetically sealed compartments, sometimes the exercise 
of powers by two spheres may result in an overlap. When this happens, neither sphere 
is intruding into the functional area of another. Each sphere would be exercising power 
within its own competence. It is in this context that the Constitution obliges these 
spheres of government to cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith, 
and to co-ordinate actions taken with one another. 
 
The Maccsand case therefore sets out that a developer may require several 
authorisations from various government entities in order to commence 
development. This is constitutional and permissible. Where one authorisation is 
granted and another denied, it is not a veto of another entity’s power, but simply 
an exercise of functional competence.70 
 
2.5.2 Town Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986: 
 
The Town Planning and Townships Ordinance, (hereafter “TPTO”)71 was a 
planning ordinance which applied to the Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo 
provinces and parts of the North-West Province.72 Planning applications made 
in terms of the TPTO were heard and decided on by the municipality,73 being a 
city, town or village council of a municipality.74 Similar to LUPO which also 
gave appeal powers to the province, appeals against decisions made by a council 
                                                        
68 Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC). 
69 Ibid, ad para 47. 
70 Ibid, ad para 48. 
71 The Town Planning and Townships Ordinance no. 15 of 1986. 
72 Ibid, clause 1, definition of “province”. 
73 Ibid, clause 56(1). 




in terms of the TPTO on planning applications were heard by the Director,  who 
an officer in the provincial administration of that province designated to perform 
the functions entrusted by or under the TPTO.75 
 
Similar to the court challenges to LUPO, it was recognized in the case Pieterse 
N.O. and Another v Lephalale Local Municipality and Others that the TPTO 
allowed the provinces to usurp the power of finally deciding planning 
applications instead of municipalities.76  
 
In this case, the applicants made planning applications to Lephalale Local 
Municipality for the use of pieces of land in terms of the TPTO, which 
applications were refused by Lephalale Local Municipality. Aggrieved by the 
refusals, the applicants were advised by Lephalale Local Municipality of their 
rights to lodge appeals against the decisions to the Director. The applicants 
believing this appeal procedure to be an unlawful exercise of provincial power, 
and an unnecessary hurdle, approached the Pretoria High Court, for an order 
that the decision of the municipality be reviewed and overturned, and that clause 
139 of the TPTO be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it amounted 
to the province interfering in a municipal competence.77 This order was granted, 
and it was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation. 
 
The Constitutional Court followed the reasoning of the Habitat Council case 
and confirmed the order of the High Court, insofar as it unlawfully allowed the 
province to administer and decide planning applications. In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court made the following statement:78 
 
In short, section 139 allows for a parallel or concurrent authority at provincial level to 
countermand the Municipality in an area of competence assigned exclusively to it.  In 
this, it fails to observe municipal autonomy.  And it constitutes constitutionally 
impermissible provincial interference.  The High Court was correct to declare the 
provision inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.  
                                                        
75 Ibid clause 59(1). 
76 Pieterse N.O. and Another v Lephalale Local Municipality and Others 2017 (2) BCLR 233 (CC). 
77 Pieterse N.O. v Lephalale Local Municipality unreported judgment of the High Court of South Africa, 
Gauteng Division, Pretoria Case No. 79281/14 (25 May 2016) (High Court judgment). 





2.5.3 Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949: 
 
The Natal Town Planning Ordinance (hereafter “NTPO”)79 formerly governed 
planning applications in KwaZulu-Natal. The NTPO created the town planning 
appeals board, which was a provincial appeal authority, which similar to LUPO 
and the TPTO, allowed a provincial body to decide appeals against planning 
decisions made by municipalities.80 This ordinance was later repealed by the 
KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act (hereafter “PDA”).81 
 
The PDA provides for planning applications, such as amendments of the town 
planning scheme,82 and subdivisions of land,83 which are heard by and decided 
upon by a municipality. However, appeals made against these planning 
decisions were heard and decided by the planning and development appeal 
tribunal, another provincial body.84 
 
Notwithstanding its repeal, certain provisions of the NTPO remained in force 
after the enactment of the PDA, which provisions primarily related to special 
consent applications and appeals thereto.85 The PDA also kept the town 
planning appeal board alive. Therefore, for a time from 2008 to early 2016, there 
were two provincial planning appeal bodies in KwaZulu-Natal with powers to 
overturn municipal decisions.86  
 
The case that changed this position was the case of Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd 
v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal and Others.87 
This case involved a mining concern, Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd, which made 
                                                        
79 The Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949. 
80 Ibid, clause73bis. 
81 Section 162 and schedule 2 of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act 6 of 2008.  
82 Ibid, section 9. 
83 Ibid, section 21. 
84 Ibid, sections 45 and 100. 
85 Ibid, section 163(2) and schedule 3. 
86 The dates indicate a period from when the PDA was enacted until it was declared unconstitutional on 29 
January 2016, as is discussed further hereunder. 
87 Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal and 




application in terms of the PDA for the right to mine on a piece of land which 
was zoned agricultural, and which was located just outside the town of 
Mtunzini. This application was granted. The Mtunzini Conservancy, an objector 
at all times to Tronox’s operations near Mtunzini, appealed the decision to the 
planning and development appeal tribunal. Before the appeals were heard, 
Tronox applied to Pietermaritzburg High Court for an order declaring sections 
45 and chapter 10 of the PDA to be unconstitutional.88  
 
The Pietermaritzburg High Court followed the reasoning of the Habitat Council 
and Gauteng Development Tribunal cases and granted the order sought, stating: 
 
The operation of s 45 and Chapter 10, in my view, usurps the functions of a 
municipality. It does not preserve the autonomy of municipalities, and constitutes 
provincial government interference with the sphere of the municipality’s constitutional 
empowerment to make decisions relating to municipal planning. I am accordingly of 
the view that Habitat is indistinguishable from the circumstances of this matter.  
 
The Constitutional Court confirmed this order, again confirming the 
municipalities’ exclusive competence of municipal planning:89 
 
Section 45 impermissibly interferes with municipalities’ exclusive constitutional 
power.  The contention that the establishment of the Appeal Tribunal and the provision 
of an internal appeal does not involve the exercise of a provincial function or power is 
unconvincing.  The Appeal Tribunal is established by the Province through legislation, 
namely the PDA, and this legislation subjects municipalities to an appeal process 
without their consent and regardless of whether or not they think it is appropriate. 
 
Although it is true that the Appeal Tribunal is not staffed by provincial officials (and 
the appellate oversight is not exercised by the Administrator/MEC, as was the case 
in Habitat Council), the Habitat Council decision, boiled down to its essence, 
establishes that local authorities have the power to manage “municipal planning”.  This 
power is autonomous and under no circumstances can it be intruded upon.  Therefore, 
the alleged “independence” of the Appeal Tribunal does not necessarily render Habitat 
Council inapplicable.  The fact that municipalities are subjected to an appeal process 
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by the Province also intrudes upon their autonomous power.  The Province’s 
involvement in appointing persons to the Appeal Tribunal and its administrative 
influence exacerbate the intrusion. 
  
Another legal challenge relating to the conflict between provincial and 
municipal exercises of power in KwaZulu-Natal, was the case of Le Sueur and 
Another v Ethekwini Municipality and Others.90 In this case, the applicants 
owned a piece of land which fell within the jurisdiction of the eThekwini 
Municipality.  
 
The eThekwini Municipality had developed and implemented the DMOSS, 
(Durban Metropolitan Open Space System), an environmental control, designed 
to demarcate and preserve areas of high biodiversity and environmental 
significance.91 Part of the applicants’ land was designated as environmentally 
significant in terms of the DMOSS, and the result of such demarcation was that 
the applicants were precluded from developing the affected portions of their 
land.  
 
The applicants therefore applied to High Court for an order declaring the 
DMOSS to be unconstitutional, as the eThekwini Municipality could not 
lawfully legislate on environmental matters as it is an issue which falls outside 
of its competence.92   
 
The High Court disagreed with this argument, and found that municipal 
planning automatically and necessarily encompasses the environment, stating:93 
 
Municipalities under the banner of “municipal planning” have historically always 
exercised executive legislative responsibility over environmental affairs within a 
municipal area. The drafters of the Constitution were aware of this fact and recognized 
this fact in the manner in which the newer Constitutional dispensation was formulated. 
                                                        
90 Le Sueur and Another v Ethekwini Municipality and Others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 
2013). 
91 eThekwini Municipality, ‘D’MOSS An integral component of the eThekwini Planning Schemes, 
http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Services/development_planning_management/environmental_planning_climate
_protection/Durban_Open_Space/Pages/MOSS_FAQ.aspx, accessed on 17 October 2017. 
92 Le Sueur case, para 16, see supra footnote 74. 





It is clear that both at the time that the Constitution was enacted and since then 
Municipalities have been allocated by national legislation and provincial legislation 
and policies, a legislative and executive mandate with respect to environmental 
matters, placing such matters squarely within the concept of municipal planning. 
   
This case is indicative of how the courts intend municipalities to take a proactive 
and robust approach towards planning matters, even where the competence is 
not specifically assigned to them.  
 
3. A summary of the changes introduced by SPLUMA: 
 
3.1 An overview of the goals of SPLUMA: 
 
 SPLUMA was intended to consolidate the fragmented system of planning previously 
in place.94 In contrast to the provincial ordinances, SPLUMA, as national legislation, 
applies to the entire area of the Republic.95  
 
The preamble of SPLUMA specifically addresses that it was enacted with an awareness 
of the municipal planning disputes that existed, due to manner in which planning 
competences were allocated by the previous planning legislation and ordinances. 
Specifically, it mentions: 
 
…AND WHEREAS various laws governing land use give rise to uncertainty about the status 
of municipal spatial planning and land use management systems and procedures and frustrates 
the achievement of cooperative governance and the promotion of public interest… 
 
This statement recognises that a new approach to municipal planning, amongst other 
planning, was required, which system SPLUMA purported to provide. It provides a 
statutory definition for municipal planning, which includes:96 
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(c)    the control and regulation of the use of land within the municipal area where the nature, 
scale and intensity of the land use do not affect the provincial planning mandate of 
provincial government or the national interest. 
 
It is therefore clear that SPLUMA, among other purposes, was enacted to give effect to 
the Constitutional obligation on local government to administer municipal planning and 
resultant land use. 
 
3.2 SPLUMA and municipal planning tribunals: 
 
SPLUMA requires municipalities to prepare and administer land use schemes:97 These 
land use schemes allow municipalities to determine and set out what types, and to what 
extent, development can take place. SPLUMA also requires that Municipalities must 
set out, in their land use schemes, how the land use can be altered, through land use 
applications.98  
 
In SPLUMA’s definition section, it also includes the following definition:99  
 
‘Land development’ mans the erection of buildings or structures on land, or the change of use 
of land, including township establishment, the subdivision or consolidation of land or any 
deviation from the land use or uses permitted in terms of an applicable land use scheme.  
  
SPLUMA introduces a new body to determine land use and land development 
applications, namely municipal planning tribunals. It provides that,100 “Except as 
provided in this Act, all land development applications must be submitted to a 
municipality as the authority of first instance” and then goes on to provide that,101 “A 
municipality must, in order to determine land use and development applications within 
its municipal area, establish a municipal planning tribunal”. 
 
                                                        
97 SPLUMA, section 24(3). 
98 Ibid, sections 25 and 26(4) read with regulation 14 of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management 
Regulations: Land Use Management and General Matters, 2015, GN R239 in GG 38594 of 23 March 2015, 
(hereafter the “Regulations”). 
99 Ibid, section 1. 
100 Ibid, section 33(1). 




While each municipality is obliged to set up a municipal planning tribunal, SPLUMA 
does make provision for two or more municipalities to appoint a joint municipal 
planning tribunal in respect of those municipalities.102 Furthermore, a district 
municipality may, with the consent of local municipalities falling within its area, form 
a single municipal planning tribunal.103 However, before such a decision to set up a 
joint municipal planning tribunal can be taken, municipalities must consider the effect 
of the decision according to strict criteria.104 
 
Municipalities are also entitled to make provision for certain types of land use 
application to be decided by a single official, and others by the municipal planning 
tribunal.105 
 
Municipal planning tribunals may hear and decide land development applications for 
change in the use, form or function of land,106 which includes: township 
establishment;107 the subdivision of land;108 the consolidation of different pieces of 
land;109 the amendment of a land use or town planning scheme;110 or the removal, 
amendment or suspension of a restrictive condition.111 
 
SPLUMA has also included a provision which expressly states that ‘where an 
application or authorisation is required in terms of any other legislation for a related 
land use, such application must also be made or such authorisation must also be 
requested in terms of that legislation’.112 Presumably, this section was included as a 
response by the legislature to the conflict raised in the Maccsand case as discussed 
previously.  
                                                        
102 Ibid, section 34(1) read with regulations 4,5 and 6 of the Regulations. 
103 Ibid, section 34(2) read with regulations 7, 8 and 9 of the Regulations. 
104 Regulation 2(1) and 2(2) of the Regulations set out these criteria which include: the impact of the Act on the 
municipality's financial, administrative and professional capacity; the ability of the municipality to effectively 
implement the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Act; the average number of applications dealt with by the 
municipality annually in terms of existing planning legislation; and the development pressures in the municipal 
area. 
105 SPLUMA, section 35(2) and (3) read with regulation 15(4) of the Regulations. 
106 Ibid, section 41(1) 
107 Ibid, section 41(2)(a). 
108 Ibid, section 41(2)(b). 
109 Ibid, section 41(2)(c). 
110 Ibid, section 41(2)(d). 
111 Ibid, section 41(2)(e). 





SPLUMA also provides that municipalities should construct their own frameworks for 
deciding these applications through publishing their own by-laws, a power which was 
previously provided by provincial ordinances and the national legislature through the 
DFA.   
 
Finally, SPLUMA expands the scope of locus standi for persons who can submit a land 
development application. These persons include: an owner;113 a person acting as the 
duly authorised agent of the owner;114 a person to whom the land concerned has been 
made available for development in writing by an organ of state or such person's duly 
authorised agent;115 or a service provider responsible for the provision of infrastructure, 
utilities or other related services.116 In this way, not only the owner is entitled to make 
such an application, which was sometimes the case previously. Furthermore, the 
definition of owner in SPLUMA “means a person registered at a deeds office as the 
owner of land or who is the beneficial owner in law.117 A beneficial owner in law is 
defined by City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality in its bylaws as:118  
 
…means where the Municipality determines for purposes of this By-law that specific property 
rights and equity in the property(ies) in terms of any repealed or other law grants such beneficial 
ownership and lawfully belongs to a person(s) even though dominium or formal title of the 
property has not been registered or transferred.” 
 
Interpreting “beneficial owner” as City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality has 
done, therefore casts the net wide and allows a wider spectrum of land rights holders to 






                                                        
113 Ibid, section 45(1)(a). 
114 Ibid, section 45(1)(b). 
115 Ibid, section 45(1)(c). 
116 Ibid, section 45(1)(d). 
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3.3 SPLUMA and land use appeals: 
 
SPLUMA’s new appeal procedure is stated as follows:119 
 
(1) A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a municipal planning tribunal 
may appeal against that decision by giving written notice of the appeal and reasons to 
the municipal manager within 21 days of the date of notification of the decision. 
 
(2) The municipal manager must within a prescribed period submit the appeal to the 
executive authority of the municipality as the appeal authority. 
 
(3)  The appeal authority must consider the appeal and confirm, vary or revoke the 
decision. 
 
(4)  A person whose rights are affected within the provisions of subsection (1) includes- 
(a)    an applicant contemplated in section 45 (1); 
(b)    the municipality where the land affected by the application is located; 
(c)    an interested person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the 
outcome of the land development application proceedings. 
 
(5)  An interested person for the purpose of subsection (4) (c) must be a person having a 
pecuniary or proprietary interest who is adversely affected or able to demonstrate that 
she or he will be adversely affected by the decision of the planning tribunal or an appeal 
in respect of such a decision. 
 
(6)  A municipality may, in the place of its executive authority, authorise that a body or 
institution outside of the municipality or in a manner regulated in terms of a provincial 
legislation, assume the obligations of an appeal authority in terms of this section. 
 
(7)  No appeal in respect of a decision taken in terms of or pursuant to this Act may be 
lodged in terms of section 62 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
 
SPLUMA therefore makes some noteworthy changes to appeals against land 
development applications that existed prior to its enactment. The first point to note is 
that the appeal body is no longer a provincial or national body, but rather the executive 
authority of the municipality in question.120 The definition of executive authority in 
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SPLUMA provides that it consists of the executive committee or the executive mayor, 
or in absence of those, a committee of councillors appointed by the Municipal 
Council.121 It is for this reason that the appeal mechanism is referred to as an internal 
appeal in the heading of the relevant section of SPLUMA,122 as it relates to a 
municipality re-considering an application which it has previously decided on. 
 
A second change is that SPLUMA entitles, “…a person whose rights were affected by 
a decision taken by municipal planning tribunal…” to lodge an internal appeal, 
(“person” includes a natural or juristic person123).124 This is further expanded on by 
saying that this includes an applicant in terms of section 45(1) of SPLUMA,125 the 
municipality where the land affected by the application is located,126 and/or an 
interested person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the outcome of the 
land development application proceedings.127 Interested parties are also entitled to join 
appeal proceedings after they have commenced,128 provided they can show that they 
have an interest in the matter, to the satisfaction of the appeal authority.129  
 
While SPLUMA provides that the executive authorities of municipalities are the 
designated bodies for the receiving and deciding of appeals,130 it also allows 
municipalities to appoint external bodies, or bodies authorised in terms of provincial 
legislation, to deal with these appeals, rather than their executive authorities.131  
 
3.4 SPLUMA’s regulations 
 
SPLUMA provides that the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform may 
make regulations relating to procedures concerning the lodging, consideration and 
                                                        
121 Ibid, section 1. 
122 Ibid, section 51. 
123 Ibid, section 1. 
124 Ibid, section 51(1). 
125 Ibid, section 51(4)(a). 
126 Ibid, section 51(4)(b). 
127 Ibid, section 51(4)(c). 
128 Ibid, section 45(2). 
129 Ibid, sections 45(4) and 51(4) read with regulation 31 of the Regulations. 
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decision on appeals,132 the fees payable in connection with applications and appeals,133 
and any ancillary or incidental matter that is necessary for the proper implementation 
and administration of this Act.134  
 
Furthermore, different regulations may also be made for different categories of 
municipal planning tribunals,135 land use schemes,136 development applications and 
appeals.137 The Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform has published such 
Regulations.138 
 
The Regulations specifically state that municipalities must determine appeal 
procedures, and these procedures must make provision for appeals to an executive 
authority,139 to a body other than an executive authority if so designated,140 to another 
body authorised by provincial legislation,141 or a duly appointed official.142 
  
The Regulations also state that an appeal authority has both appeal and review powers, 
being able to decide on the merits of a land development application143 and the 
procedural fairness of an administrative act.144 
 
It further sets out the types of decisions an appeal authority can make in respect of an 
appeal and these include the right to confirm, vary, or revoke a decision made by a 
municipal planning tribunal or a delegated official.145 If a decision of a municipal 
planning tribunal or designated official is set aside, the appeal authority can either refer 
the decision back to the municipal planning tribunal or designated official, or replace 
the decision with one of its own.146  
                                                        
132 Ibid, section 54(1)(f). 
133 Ibid, section 54(1)(h). 
134 Ibid, section 54(1)(l). 
135 Ibid, section 54(3)(a). 
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137 Ibid, section 54(3)(c). 
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139 Regulation 20(a) of the Regulations. 
140 Ibid, regulation 20(b). 
141 Ibid, regulation 20(c). 
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The Regulations also specify other procedural issues relating to the form and manner 
of the appeal hearing;147 the parties’ rights to representation;148 the discovery process;149 
and the time frames for the appeal.150 
 
3.5 SPLUMA by-laws: 
 
SPLUMA provides for municipalities to prepare by-laws aimed at enforcing their land 
use schemes.151 The municipal by-laws are further referred to in several ways, in the 
Regulations.152  
 
As an illustrative example, the eThekwini Municipality has passed such by-laws, 
known as the eThekwini Municipality: Planning and Land Use Management By-laws 
2016 (hereafter “the By-laws”).153  
  
The By-laws are cognizant of the eThekwini Municipality’s obligations to form a 
municipal planning tribunal and designate an appeal authority, as evident by the objects 
of the By-laws, which include, amongst others, to:154 
 
(g)  regulate land development application and decision-making procedures;  
(h)  provide for the establishment, functions and operations of the Tribunal;  
(i)  provide for facilitation and enforcement of land use and development measures;  
(j)  provide for an appeal authority; and  
(k)  provide penalties for breach of its provisions. 
   
The By-laws, then set out that no person may commence with land development 
without authorisation in terms of the By-laws.155 It also adds that if any authorisation is 
required from another organ of state, it must accompany the land development 
                                                        
147 Ibid, regulation 23. 
148 Ibid, regulation 24.  
149 Ibid, regulation 25. 
150 Ibid, regulation 30. 
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application to the municipality. This again appears to be a confirmation of the ratio 
found in the Maccsand judgment.156 
  
The By-laws also specify the persons who are entitled and/or qualified to make a land 
development application157 and the manner in which land development applications 
must be made, including practical considerations,158 such as the submission of 
necessary documents.159 
 
As allowed for in the Regulations,160 the By-laws have also made provision for different 
categories of land development applications.161 In this respect, the By-laws set out the 
competent authority to decide each type application, which are split into four, namely:  
 
Category 1 applications, which include adoption and amendment of land use schemes, 
which is undertaken by the Municipal Council;162  
 
Category 2 applications, where there is a departure from the Municipal Spatial 
Development Framework, rezonings where there have been objections, zoning, and 
combined applications, which include one or more of the land development uses set out 
above as well as any land uses falling with in category 3 and 4, which must be heard by 
the municipal planning tribunal;163  
 
Category 3 applications, which include special consents, subdivisions, township 
establishment, closure of roads and public spaces, rezoning in line with the Municipal 
Spatial Development Framework, removal or suspension of restrictive conditions, 
development of land outside the scheme, and combined applications of the above and 
land uses falling in category 4 applications, must all be decided by the Head;164 and  
 
                                                        
156 Ibid, clause 21(3). 
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162 Ibid, clause 26. 
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Category 4 applications, which include relaxations where the necessary consent/s have 
been obtained, exemption from the provisions of the land use scheme where the 
necessary consent/s have been obtained, notarial tie of adjacent land, and development 
of land outside of a scheme in respect of a relaxation or exemption where the necessary 
consent/s have been obtained, are all to be decided by the Deputy-Head.165 
 
In this way, the By-laws, set out that certain land development applications, Category 
2 and 3, have been delegated away from the municipal planning tribunals, to other 
entities. This is in line with section 35(2) of SPLUMA, (read with regulation 15(2) of 
the Regulations) which allows an authorised representative to hear certain types of land 
development applications. 
 
If one looks at the factors that a municipality must consider before it delegates a land 
development application to an official, (which factors can be found in the 
Regulations166), it is evident that the eThekwini Municipality has ranked the 
applications in terms of “difficulty” or “complication”, from hardest to simplest and 
delegated accordingly. Therefore, a rezoning application to which objections have been 
made must be heard by the municipal planning tribunal,167 whereas relaxation 
applications where consents of neighbours have already been obtained, can be heard by 
the Deputy-Head on his/her own.168  
 
The By-Laws also regulate the types of land development applications which require 
public participation169 and what that public participation must entail.170 This allows 
                                                        
165 Ibid, clause 29, read with clause 1, the definition of “Deputy-Head”. 
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interested parties the opportunity to consider the application, and lodge an objection if 
they so wish.171  
 
Clause 38 of the By-laws gives effect to SPLUMA’s requirement to establish a 
municipal planning tribunal, and the By-laws also add that no other organ of state may 
interfere with the functions of the municipal planning tribunal172 and the members must 
act impartially and without outside influence.173  
 
Furthermore, the By-Laws specify exactly how the municipal planning tribunal should 
be comprised, which summarized, states that the members should include designated 
officials in the full-time employ of the eThekwini Municipality, and external persons 
appointed by the Municipal Council.174 The qualifications and expertise of the officials 
and external persons are also specified.175  
 
The By-laws then set out how appeals are to be handled in the eThekwini Municipality. 
Clause 55 states that the Executive Authority is the appeal authority in terms of 
SPLUMA, and that the Executive Authority may delegate its functions to an official 
within the eThekwini Municipality. This is a simple duplication of sub-sections 51(2) 
and (6) of SPLUMA.  
 
The By-laws are an example of a municipality promulgating by-laws aimed at giving 
effect to SPLUMA. 
 
3.6 SPLUMA, section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act and review 
applications in terms of PAJA: 
 
Section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (hereafter “MSA”),176 
provides a general appeal mechanism for appeals against decisions of municipalities. 
The appeal lies against decisions taken by political structures, political office bearers, 
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councillors or staff of a municipality. This appeal is heard by the municipal manager, 
the executive committee, the executive mayor or the council of the municipality, 
depending on who made the initial decision. 
 
Where an appellant is unhappy with the outcome of the appeal provided by section 62 
of the MSA, its remedy is to review the decision, in terms of section 6(1) of PAJA, 
effectively requesting a court to consider whether the decision was unlawful. A review 
application in terms of section 6(1) of PAJA is not permissible unless an applicant has 
complied with section 7(2)(a) of PAJA, requiring that an applicant exhaust all internal 
remedies beforehand. An appeal in terms of section 62 of the MSA is therefore an 
internal remedy for the purposes of section 7(2)(a) of PAJA.  
 
Section 51(7) of SPLUMA, specifically excludes the application of section 62 of the 
MSA to decisions in terms of SPLUMA. As SPLUMA itself provides an appeal 
mechanism in section 51, section 51(7) was obviously included to ensure that an 
appellant does not file two separate appeals on the same decision, one through section 
62 of the MSA and the other section 51 of SPLUMA.  
 
The appeal provided in section 51 of SPLUMA will therefore constitute an internal 
remedy for the purposes of section 7(2)(a) of PAJA. Therefore, before an applicant may 
review a decision of a municipality in terms of section 6(1) of PAJA it must ensure that 
it lodges an appeal in terms of section 51. In the ordinary course, purely due to the cost 
implications of high court litigation, it is unlikely that a disgruntled applicant would go 
straight to high court without first trying to appeal the decision in terms of section 51 













4. Has SPLUMA been successful in changing South African planning law: 
 
4.1 The success of SPLUMA: 
 
The reception of SPLUMA has been overwhelmingly positive. SPLUMA has been 
praised as follows:177 
 
With the approval of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) (Act 16 
of 2013) and the SPLUMA Regulations (23 March, 2015), the last bastion of spatial and 
statutory planning legislation reform from the previous political dispensation within 
municipalities was transformed…Thus far, SPLUMA (2013) seems to be a step ahead in the 
alignment of spatial planning, land use management, and land development; 
 
and further:178  
 
Prior to the advent of SPLUMA planning law was severely fragmented, consisting as it did of 
levels and layers of confusing, disparate legislation. There was a dire need for reform. SPLUMA 
constitutes an important step towards a uniform system, which is nationally applicable and more 
modern in its approach to planning. 
 
Generally speaking, SPLUMA has addressed the issue of provincial interference with 
municipal functions fairly comprehensively and effectively, as has been discussed 
above in Chapter 3. It is therefore appropriate for Chapter 4’s focus to be an assessment 
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4.2 The lawfulness of a municipality reviewing and replacing its own decision: 
 
Criticism has been levelled at SPLUMA for the appeal processes it prescribes and it has 
been stated that, “The municipality's ability to appeal to its own executive authority is, 
at face value, a somewhat ludicrous notion”179 and stated further:180 
 
Appeals are heard either by the executive authority of the municipality (the executive committee 
or the executive mayor) or by a body or institution outside of the municipality. In terms of reg 
23 the appeal authority may hear the appeal by means of a ‘written hearing’ or an ‘oral hearing’. 
I submit that both formulations are unfortunate. Firstly, in some municipalities the executive 
authority will serve as the appeal authority. In others, an outside body will be designated. A 
greater degree of objectivity can, naturally, be expected from outside bodies. Secondly, the 
decision to hold a hearing or not is discretionary and no objective criteria are set out for purposes 
of exercising the discretion. In practice, very few appeal hearings are held. In the previous 
planning paradigm most provinces convened a Townships Board for purposes of hearing 
appeals. Large amounts of institutional expertise developed within the boards, as well as a high 
degree of objectivity. This might now have been lost. 
    
It does seem counterintuitive that the overall entity making a decision on an application, 
is the same entity that reconsiders a decision on appeal. Once an entity has made a 
decision it is essentially functus officio and precluded from re-making that decision.181 
It therefore follows, that a municipality’s municipal planning tribunal which has made 
a decision on a land development application, should be precluded from re-visiting the 
decision “under the cloak” of an appeal authority. Both the municipal planning tribunal 
and the appeal authority are entities within the same municipality, and it is accordingly 
the same municipality making two decisions on one land development application. 
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However, SPLUMA and the Regulations contain several provisions aimed at ensuring 
the independence of the appeal authority and its distinctiveness from the municipal 
planning tribunals.  
 
For example, SPLUMA states that the composition of a municipal planning tribunal 
must be made up of municipal officials and persons who are not municipal officials and 
who have knowledge and experience of spatial planning, land use management and land 
development or the law related thereto.182 SPLUMA also provides that municipal 
councillors may not be appointed as members of a municipal planning tribunal.183 
Presumably these are included to minimise political interference. SPLUMA also states 
that members of municipal planning tribunals should disclose any conflict of interest,184 
and may not take part in the municipal planning tribunals if he/she has such a conflict 
of interest.185 
 
A municipality may also authorise another body or institution outside of the 
municipality to assume the obligations of the appeal authority.186 Such an authorisation 
could be done to avoid a conflict of interest or where the appeal relates to large or 
technical matter, requiring an independent body with the competence and capacity to 
effectively determine the appeal. 
  
Presumably also with the intention of minimizing political interference, the Regulations 
state that:187 
 
The appeal authority may not delegate its power to hear an appeal to an official in the employ 
of the municipality who decided the application or who is a member of the municipal planning 
tribunal that made a decision on the application that forms the subject matter of the appeal. 
 
Despite these sections and regulations respectively, it is unclear whether the municipal 
planning tribunals and appeal authorities can ever be completely free from outside 
influence and completely impartial. Furthermore, it can be argued that if another entity 
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outside the municipality were to decide appeals on its behalf, it would be encroaching 
on the municipality’s exclusive competence of municipal planning. 
 
It is noteworthy that other appeal mechanisms exist where a decision is reviewed and 
reconsidered by essentially the same entity. Examples of these appeal mechanisms are 
appeals in terms of section 62 of the MSA, (as discussed above), and appeals in terms 
of section 61 of the KwaZulu-Natal Liquor Licensing Act,188 which act provides that 
decisions made by the liquor authority on license applications in terms of section 41 of 
the act can thereafter be appealed to the executive council of the liquor authority in 
terms of section 61 of the act. In this way the liquor authority can essentially remake its 
own decision. Another example is the process for obtaining environmental 
authorisations and appeal thereto in terms of the National Environmental Management 
Act.189 Applications for environmental authorisations are made to officials designated 
by the MEC’s or the Minister who oversees environmental affairs (depending on the 
nature of the application)190 and those same MEC’s or the Minister must then re-assess 
those decisions when appeals are lodged against the decisions.191 
 
4.3 The legality of authorisations in terms of section 51(6) of SPLUMA:  
 
Section 51(6) of SPLUMA provides that, “A municipality may, in the place of its 
executive authority, authorise that a body or institution outside of the municipality or 
in a manner regulated in terms of a provincial legislation, assume the obligations of an 
appeal authority in terms of this section”. 
  
Section 51(6) of SPLUMA effectively means that a municipality, unwilling or 
incapable of considering appeals against decisions of municipal planning tribunals, 
could authorise a provincial body, (for example the town planning appeals board or 
planning and development appeal tribunal), to handle appeals on its behalf.  
 
 The problem encountered with such an authorisation is stated as follows:192 
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A question that arises is whether the potential composition of the Municipal Planning Tribunals 
and the fact that delegation of powers can take place is not akin to the DFA tribunal setup 
declared unconstitutional in the GDT (CC) judgement? After all, Section 156(1)(a) of the 
Constitution states that a Municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to 
administer ... municipal planning. 
 
It would appear at face value that this is precisely the issue caused by the ordinances 
and the DFA that SPLUMA was enacted to remedy. However, the difference in the case 
of section 51(6) is that the municipality is choosing to authorise another entity to 
undertake its function, it hasn’t been usurped or authorised by the provincial or national 
government to do so.  Municipalities have the right to choose the model and form of 
their appeal authority, to their liking. 
 
There is provision in both the Constitution193 and SPLUMA194 to allow national and 
provincial governments to assist municipalities in the exercise of their functions and 
the extent of this assistance is summarised as follows: 195 
 
Yet, municipalities cannot operate entirely independently and their powers may be curtailed by 
the following constitutional provisions. Firstly, national government and provincial 
governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by 
municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5, by regulating 
the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority. Secondly, provincial government has 
the powers of monitoring and supporting local government in the provinces as well as of 
promoting the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform 
their functions and manage their affairs. Thirdly, when a province or a municipality cannot or 
does not fulfil an executive obligation in terms of legislation, the national or the relevant 
provincial executive may intervene by taking appropriate steps. 
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Therefore, it is consistent with the Constitution that the municipalities are able to 
authorise a province to assist with municipal planning where appropriate. 
 
4.4 The public participation requirements of SPLUMA:  
 
A major criticism of SPLUMA is its lack of specificity on public participation. 
SPLUMA essentially provides that public participation is a matter to be left to 
regulations.196 The Regulations simply state that each municipality must determine the 
public participation process required for each land development application.197 
 
SPLUMA does not contain an automatic objection right to interested and affected 
parties as was contained in previous ordinances and acts. Instead a person wishing to 
object is now required to apply for an intervener status to be allowed to participate in a 
land development application.198 There are no objective criteria for deciding whether a 
person should be granted this status, and in summing up the issue it was stated:199  
 
One of the most notable omissions from SPLUMA is that in providing land use change 
procedures it does not mention that interested and affected parties may object to applications. 
This has been a key feature of planning procedures for many decades, and it has provided a 
valuable procedural remedy to neighbouring property owners, residents, activists, and even 
competitors who oppose proposed land use change.  
  
The benefit of this intervener process in SPLUMA to objectors is that there is no time 
restriction on when an interested party may intervene. This will undoubtedly cause 
headaches for municipalities who do not regulate this issue in their by-laws and receive 
intervener petitions at the eleventh hour, delaying decisions being made. 
 
SPLUMA, in leaving the public participation requirements up to municipalities has also 
created a situation where certain municipalities’ public participation requirements may 
be stricter than others. This problem has been noted and commented on as follows:200 
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Some by-laws provide for an objection procedure. It is not inconceivable, however, that some 
by-laws might not provide one. Practitioners will have to consider the by-laws of the 
municipality concerned before deciding how best to oppose a land use application or to resist 
an objection. 
 
A case with applicability to this very issue is the recent Eastern Cape High Court, 
Grahamstown case of Zimmerman v Ndlambe Municipality and Others.201 In this case, 
the applicant sought to review the Ndlambe Municipality’s decisions to approve 
rezoning and departure applications made by her neighbour in terms of section 6(1) of 
PAJA. Among the reasons the applicant raised in arguments for the review to succeed 
was that she was not afforded an opportunity to object, to make submissions prior to 
the decision, to be given reasons for the decision, to be given the full record of the 
decision or to be availed of her appeal rights.  
 
The municipality argued that as she was not an initial party to the application, she was 
not entitled to automatically object and was required to petition to intervene in terms of 
section 45 of SPLUMA. 
 
The Court rejected the municipality’s arguments and, in following the decisions of BEF 
(Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality202 and JDJ Properties CC and Another v Umngeni 
Local Municipality,203 held that the applicant’s interest as a neighbour was sufficient to 
give her standing as an objector and the protections for fair administrative action in 
terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution and PAJA.204 In this regard, the court added 
that:205 
 
In applications for large scale township development schemes there may well be a necessity for 
applications in terms of section 45 of the Act as an intervening party and the Tribunal to take a 
view on such an applicant’s rights. This does not affect the long held legal rights of neighbouring 
property owners where their properties and rights to preservation and enjoyment of the 
amenities associated with properties falling within an established scheme. 
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Finally, in summing up the matter, the court made the following obiter statement:206 
 
Officials of municipalities as organs of state are expected when executing their daily functions 
to adhere to the well-meaning principles of ‘Batho Pele’ (people first) when dealing with land 
owning ratepayers. Those principles are about placing the interests of people before any other 
demands and the end objective is the promotion of accountability and good governance. Section 
195(1) of the Constitution invokes the principle that public administration must be accountable. 
What was done is contrary to these lofty aspirations of the Constitution, PAJA and SPLUMA 
expected of officials charged with the responsibility to manage the first respondent. 
 
While this case was not heard in the Constitutional Court and is only of persuasive 
value in other courts, the judgment gives a clear indication that the courts will not 
rigidly adhere to the requirements of SPLUMA where it fails to provide opportunity for 
adequate and meaningful public participation. The courts will ensure that the 
administrative rights in terms of the Constitution and PAJA are provided for in land 
development applications despite SPLUMA’s shortcomings. 
 
4.5 The ability of municipalities to implement SPLUMA financially:  
 
There have been questions as to municipalities’ abilities to set up and maintain 
tribunals.207 Furthermore, it appears that a lack of funds has slowed down the 
finalisation of the by-laws in certain provinces, as no additional funds were allocated 
to municipalities to implement SPLUMA.208 
 
SPLUMA affording municipalities more definitive powers has been described as being 
a “hollow victory”, as while the municipalities of major metropolitans such as 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban have the ratepayer base to afford the 
implementation of SPLUMA this is not the case with the vast majority of municipalities 
in the country. Twenty-seven percent of municipalities have been described by the 
Auditor General as being in a particularly poor financial position by the end of 2015 to 
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2016, with material uncertainty with regard to their ability to continue operating in the 
foreseeable future.209 If almost a third of municipalities in South Africa are unsure of 
their continued existence, it is rather unlikely that SPLUMA can realistically be 
expected to successfully be implemented.  
 
To give an idea of the extent of debt that municipalities in South Africa find themselves 
in, the following summary is frighteningly informative:210 
 
Municipal debt – which includes both non-current and current liabilities – totalled R211 billion 
in 2016. With total assets worth R737 billion, that translates to a debt ratio of 29%. In other 
words, 29c of every rand used to finance municipal operations was in the form of debt. 
. 
With much larger issues facing municipalities, such as the possibility of not being able 
to provide water211 or electricity212 to their ratepayers, the implementation of SPLUMA 
may take a back seat to basic human rights.  
 
4.6 The time taken to implement SPLUMA:  
 
While SPLUMA was enacted on 5 August 2013, it only commenced on 1 July 2015, 
leaving an almost two year waiting period. The Regulations only became effective on 
13 November 2015, delaying proper implementation of SPLUMA for a further four 
months. This delay was criticised for “holding up” twelve billion rands worth of 
development projects.213 
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After the various court decisions referred to above, the various provinces initially got 
to work at provincial level, developing new provincial planning laws that would be 
consistent with the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of “municipal planning”:214 
 
By the time that SPLUMA was approved, almost all provinces had draft planning laws, in 
varying degrees of readiness to implement in parallel with the national SPLUMA. To date, with 
the exception of the Western Cape’s Land Use Planning Act, none of these draft laws has been 
approved by the relevant legislatures. The reasons for this delay vary from province to province, 
but in the main it is because the national regulations in terms of SPLUMA have not yet been 
finalised, and provinces want to have a better sense of the direction that these regulations will 
take before they commit their own draft bills to the legislative process. In some provinces, the 
draft bills are simply not ready to be submitted to the relevant legislatures for consideration and 
debate.  
 
The delays in the Regulations had the knock-on effect of delaying the establishment of 
municipal planning tribunals due to the need for municipal councils to approve the 
officials’ appointments and the need to re-advertise where insufficient nominations had 
been received. Some municipal council decisions also required more than one sitting 
resulting in further delays.215  
 
The extent of the delays with the enactment and implementation of SPLUMA and the 
consequent problems as a result thereof, were succinctly summarized as follows: 216 
 
SPLUMA constitutes an important step towards a uniform system, which is nationally 
applicable and more modern in its approach to planning. However, given the central role of 
planning in guiding and regulating the manner in which our cities, towns and rural areas develop 
and change, a valuable opportunity has been missed. SPLUMA should have replaced the 
provincial planning regimes; the time lapse between SPLUMA and the new by-laws is 
problematic in practice; and the new schemes should have been ready for simultaneous 
implementation. This is particularly regrettable given the lapse of 15 years between the White 
Paper and the SPLUMA effective date. 
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For example, the following percentage of municipalities had established municipal 
planning tribunals as of 24 May 2017217: Eastern Cape - eighteen percent; Free State - 
sixty eight percent; Gauteng – thirty three percent; KwaZulu-Natal – eighteen percent; 
Limpopo – eighty two percent; Mpumalanga – one hundred percent; Northern Cape -
one hundred percent; North West –  forty four percent and Western Cape – ninety six 
percent. 
 
That means that as of May 2017, 82 percent of municipalities in Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal could not process land development applications in terms of SPLUMA. 
 
4.7 The conflict between SPLUMA and tribal/informal land:  
 
The preamble to SPLUMA sets out various problem statements which SPLUMA is 
intended to remedy. One of these problem statements is:  
 
AND WHEREAS parts of our urban and rural areas currently do not have any applicable spatial 
planning and land use management legislation and are therefore excluded from the benefits of 
spatial development planning and land use management systems.  
 
Despite this stated intention, SPLUMA is primarily designed to regulate land affairs in 
formal and regulated planning environments. A significant percentage of land is 
governed by traditional leaders and SPLUMA’s land development mechanisms will not 
be effective or considered over most of this land, which is governed by tribal leaders. 
As much as fifty percent of the land in Kwazulu-Natal is owned by the Ingonyama Trust 
and another four million hectares in the Transkei is unregistered land.218 The Institution 
of Traditional Leaders has criticised SPLUMA for not consulting with and considering 
the roles of Traditional Councils in spatial planning and land use management and 
traditional leaders have called for SPLUMA to be suspended until the matter has been 
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resolved.219 As a result thereof, traditional leaders have been unwilling to cooperate and 
participate in the implementation of SPLUMA, as they claim custodianship of tribal 
land, which SPLUMA now regulates.220 
 
While SPLUMA provides for external persons to be a part of municipal planning 
tribunals, it is required that these persons “have knowledge and experience of spatial 
planning, land use management and land development or the law related thereto.”221 
SPLUMA could have made greater provision for the specific inclusion of traditional 
leaders in municipal planning tribunals where a land development application relates to 
tribal land. 
 
5. Recommendations to address SPLUMA’s shortcomings: 
       
5.1 Greater clarity on the role of provincial and national government: 
 
SPLUMA could greatly benefit through greater clarity of the roles of the provincial and 
national governments.  
 
Firstly, the nature of the legislation that provinces are able to enact in terms of section 
10(2) should be explained in sufficient detail to allow the provinces to create useful and 
effective legislation and to ensure that there is no interference with the municipalities’ 
competence of municipal planning. 
 
SPLUMA should also have clarified/made provision for how SPLUMA will be 
implemented by municipalities financially and capacity wise, either by providing 
funding models/allocations by provincial and national government or by lessening the 
requirements incumbent on municipalities. An example of this would be for national 
government to have drafted more detailed regulations in terms of SPLUMA, which in 
turn would then require less comprehensive by-laws to be published by each 
municipality to regulate the day-to-day processes of SPLUMA. 
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Lastly, SPLUMA could have eased the administrative load on municipalities by 
allowing the various responsibilities to be shared more evenly between the various 
spheres of government: 222 
 
The legislation would have been more transformative in its approach if it allowed for capacity 
support to transcend the three spheres of government, depending on where there is capacity. It 
is clear that due to capacity constraints and the need to ensure that implementation will be 
incremental and the process will differ from local government to local government. In order to 
facilitate institutional change, targets will need to be agreed upon as to the type of skills and 
number of staff required. 
 
5.2 Involvement of tribal leaders and fostering the regulation informal land development: 
 
SPLUMA could greatly benefit from including mandatory consultation and consensus 
seeking with traditional leaders who exercise custodianship over tribal land to prevent 
the current situation of traditional leaders being ignored. 
 
SPLUMA should also provide for the establishment of “local community planning 
tribunals”, comprising members of communities, traditional leaders and local business 
persons, in addition to municipal officials, to oversee rural/informal land use 
applications. In doing so the interests of the community will be considered and given 
weight. No single community perspective (political, social, religious, or business) 
should be afforded an elevated status.223  
 
Alternatively, traditional leaders should be included as the non-municipal members in 
municipal planning tribunals, with SPLUMA to make provision for their inclusion 
where tribal land is involved. 
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It is also recommended that municipalities develop land-use schemes or precinct plans 
that incorporate informal settlements, “defining the use and the future development 
intent for each such settlement within a municipal jurisdiction”. Furthermore, 
municipalities should “fast-track mechanisms to enhance the internal capacity of 
municipal development planning departments to enforce land-use decisions and to 
monitor the implementation of these decisions particularly in relation to informal 
settlement upgrading.”224 
 
5.3 Regulation of the public participation requirements: 
 
SPLUMA, though section 54 allows the Minister to make regulations, which 
regulations may include, ‘procedures concerning the lodging of applications and the 
consideration and decision of such applications’,225 “the process for public participation 
in the preparation, adoption or amendment of a land use scheme or the performance of 
another function in terms of this Act”226 and “the operating procedures of a municipal 
planning tribunal”.227 With this authority, the Minister should promulgate regulations 
to fully set out the public participation requirements. 
 
These regulations should also clarify the criteria required to be met for “intervener” 
status and define this ambiguous term. At the very least, a neighbour to a land 
development application should automatically be granted intervener status, as discussed 
above and with reference to the Zimmerman case. 
 
Furthermore, the promulgation of regulations for public participation will be applicable 
to all municipalities equally and it will avoid the current situation where residents in 
one municipality have greater rights to participate than the residents of another 
municipality, due to different, or in some cases no, by-laws. 
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It is clear that SPLUMA radically improved a complicated, fragmented and unconstitutional 
system of planning legislation that existed prior to its development.  
 
Firstly, by consolidating all planning legislation, and providing a uniform and consistent 
system of planning, it has ensured that planning rights and obligations are easily exercisable 
and enforceable.  
 
By building on the foundations of the Draft Green Paper on Development and Planning and 
White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Development, and the various Constitutional 
Court judgments referred to above, SPLUMA has also ensured that it has returned the 
competence of municipal planning back to municipalities, as it is mandated in the Constitution. 
For this reason alone, SPLUMA should be praised.  
 
 While it wasn’t the first piece of legislation seeking to simplify planning law and speed up 
development, unlike the DFA, it managed to achieve this without compromising on municipal 
autonomy. 
 
SPLUMA has also undoubtedly brought improvements to the way land development 
applications are made and appeals thereto are decided. The fact that more groups of people are 
entitled to make land development applications is a step forward and the fact that anyone may 
appeal a decision, (unlike previously with the ordinances, where this right was usually reserved 
for initial objectors to applications). 
 
It is therefore unfortunate, that despite its overall successes, SPLUMA still has some glaring 
deficiencies that could have been addressed prior to its enactment. The lack of focus on 
traditional/tribal land and uncertainty on provincial legislation permissible in terms of 
SPLUMA are a few of the examples of where the legislature could have improved SPLUMA. 
 
There is also the underlying issue of municipalities revisiting their own decisions via acting 
appeal authorities. Municipalities will have to carefully consider whether to authorise an 
outside body to adjudicate appeals to avoid the perception of bias or political interference. 




remain unchanged before and after and SPLUMA with a province exercising the competence 
of municipal planning. 
 
The practical implementation of SPLUMA by municipalities in particular, has also been an 
issue and it is possible that SPLUMA is too idealistic, requiring too much of already struggling 
municipalities.  
 
The fact that twelve years lapsed between the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Development, and the enactment SPLUMA, two years until its commencement and six months 
until the Regulations were promulgated, has made the implementation of SPLUMA 
troublesome. 
 
Despite its flaws, the commencement of SPLUMA is mostly a success story.  Whether or not 
it practically lives up to expectations and can be successfully implemented, will depend on 
whether legal challenges and policy makers can adapt SPLUMA through necessary amendment 
and regulation.  
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